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Abstract: Governments in the US, Canada and Europe have expressed an ambition to 
stimulate education of older. In this paper, we analyze if there are effects on annual 
earnings of formal education for participants aged 42-55 at the time of enrolment in 
1994-1995. The analysis explores longitudinal population register data stretching from 
1982 to 2007. The method used is difference-in-differences propensity score matching 
based on a rich set of covariates, including indicators of health and labor market margi-
nalization. Results differ from earlier studies, implying no significant average earnings ef-
fects for males, positive effects for females, although insufficient to cover total costs.  
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1  Introduction 
Most OECD countries face increasing shares of the population in retirement rather than productive 
work. At the same time, there is a widespread belief that large groups in the mid-aged and older 
labor force have low or obsolete formal education. Consequently, education of older workers ap-
pears a viable approach to increase the tax base and total life time earnings in order to counteract 
the effects of an aging population. Policies which stimulate retraining of older workers have been 
advocated by intergovernmental political bodies such as the OECD and the European Union (OECD 
1998, 2006, EU 2001, 2008). More recently, in the US, the Obama administration has issued a six-fold 
increase in federal government assistance to community colleges, to smooth the effects of structural 
changes and assist “casualties of a changing economy” (Kellogg and Tomsho 2009). Governments in 
Canada, the UK and continental Europe have also showed increased interest (Drummond et al. 2010, 
UK Cabinet Office 2008, Schwerdt et al.2011). The motivations for these policies chiefly stem from 
expectations of positive effects on employment and production, although education may be linked to 
positive non-pecuniary effects on e.g. democracy, health and social cohesion. Empirically, several 
authors have argued that most of the positive trend in US labor force participation rates among older 
is explained by an increased educational level (Blau and Goodstein 2010) and/or by a decrease in the 
educational gap between young and old workers (Goldin and Katz 2007, Maestas and Zizzimoupolos 
2010). However, this primarily concerns education obtained at a young age. Studies addressing edu-
cation for adults have broadly speaking involved three different measures (which sometimes partly 
overlap); on-the-job-training (OJT), training programs for unemployed and formal education for 
adults at e.g. secondary or tertiary level. Many studies have found OJT to be associated with high 
earnings returns, but these are widely believed to be marred by selection issues as employers moni-
tor participation (e.g. Pischke 2007). With improved identification strategies, estimates have instead 
been close to zero (Leuven and Oosterbeck 2008, Fahr and Simons 2010). Evaluations of training 
programs for unemployed have overall indicated modest effects (Heckman et al. 1999, Kluve 2010, 
Card et al. 2010). While Heckman et al. (1999) reported a tendency of more positive effects  for fe-  3 
males; these were not corroborated in Card et al. (2010). Formal education for adults constitutes a 
much smaller literature and it is the measure we focus on in this study. In view of the emerging in-
terest among policy makers, this topic appears as a highly relevant field of research. 
The present paper provides an evaluation of the earnings effects of formal education for older, 
defined as aged 42-55 at the time of enrolment in 1994-1995. We explore exceptional data from 
Swedish population registers which include information on individuals’ labor earnings 1982-2007 and 
course registrations since 1979. Sweden is a suitable country for a study of this kind as it is an open 
economy under pressure from international competition, with changes in skill composition of labor 
demand, and several institutional factors stimulating both the demand for and supply of formal edu-
cation for adults at compulsory, upper secondary and tertiary level (henceforth AE). The richness of 
our data allows us to take into account important pre-program dynamics when modeling program 
participation (Heckman and Smith 1999). Theoretically, all individuals consider every year, at least 
implicitly, whether to enroll in AE or not by considering the net present value of their expected utility 
and opportunity costs of AE.  The decisions are therefore likely to be influenced by dynamic factors 
such as new information, skills depreciation, changes in relative wages, changes in preferences, 
changes in the expected future attachment to the labor market, changes in health and/or changes in 
borrowing constraints.
2 Using difference-in-differences propensity score matching methods, we con-
trol for ten years of pre-AE earnings and check for changes regarding indicators of health and labor 
market marginalization occurring in the year(s) prior to enrolment. Even though identification of 
causal effects can always be questioned, our main results are stable to several different assumptions 
regarding unobservables.
3  
                                                           
2  See Altonji (1993), Ben-Porath (1967), Ikenaga and Kawaguchi (2010), Iwahashi (2007), Killingsworth, (1982), McCall 
(1990), Monks (1998), Neal (1999), Wallace and Ihnen (1975), Weiss (1971). Note that the suggested dynamics imply that 
the returns to education do not necessarily fall monotonically with age, and that the optimal timing of educational invest-
ments may occur at a fairly late stage in life. 
3 A general finding in the discussion on bias in the program evaluation literature is that non-experimental evidence cannot 
easily be discarded when based on high-quality data (Heckman et al. 1999 (ch 10), Heckman and Smith 1999, Glazerman 
2003, Smith and Todd 2005, Diaz and Handa 2006, Card et al. 2010).   4 
Earlier studies of formal education for older adults have reported positive earnings effects, al-
though based on highly selected samples. In a series of papers, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (JLS, 
2003, 2005a, 2005b) analyzed the proportional returns to community college schooling among laid-
off workers in Washington State.  JLS (2005a) reported an earnings return of roughly 10 percent to a 
year of studies, and no significant differences between samples aged 22-35 and 36-59 at the time of 
job loss. The private net benefits for the sample aged above 35 were lower as their expected time 
until retirement was substantially shorter, calculations indicating an internal rate of return to society 
of around 4 percent. The sample studied was conditioned to be attached to the Washington State 
unemployment insurance covered workforce during 14 years, reducing the sample from 167,000 to 
65,000 (JLS 2005a, p412).
 4 
European studies include Schwerdt et al. (2011) who explored data from Switzerland on individ-
uals aged 20-60, subject to a randomly distributed voucher system that could be redeemed for AE 
during the first half of 2006. Some 18 percent of the individuals with vouchers also used them and 
completed on average 42 hours of courses, but there was no effect on labor market outcomes one 
year after education was completed. Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) analyzed the effects of AE in 
Sweden on a sample aged 25-55 at the time of enrolment in 1997. The study was limited to long-
term unemployed who had zero annual earnings in 1996 and 1997. Six years later, in 2003, the esti-
mated effect of AE (binary variable) on earnings was sizeable, covering the costs to society within five 
to seven years. They found no differences in the returns between the older and the younger half of 
their sample. Stenberg (2011) studied a more broadly defined and younger sample, aged 24-43 in 
1994. Using family fixed effects, and with access to completed course credits, the reported earnings 
return to a year of AE was about 4.5 percent by 2004 when aged 34-53.
5 Again, there were no age-
                                                           
4 Jepsen et al. (2009) present estimates on earnings of student intentions to complete community college in Kentucky. 
Sample size is 46,500 (no non-participants), with an average age of 28.8 (std. dev. 11). Estimates are overall reasonably 
similar across age-groups and about 40 percent higher for females compared with males. On Canadian survey data col-
lected over six years, Zhang and Palameta (2006) studied a smaller sample of community college participants (1,462 indi-
viduals). A positive earnings impact was only found for individuals aged 17-34 who had completed a certificate. No signifi-
cant effects were found for individuals aged 35-59.  
5 The working paper version, Stenberg (2009), reconciles mixed results from Albrecht et al. (2004) and Ekström (2003).   5 
related differences in the earnings returns of the treated but calculations indicated that the benefits 
only barely covered the total costs incurred by society. To motivate the expenses, social returns were 
required to exceed the private returns of AE by at least one third. Finally, Stenberg et al. (2011) ana-
lyzed if participation in AE 1986-1989 affected the timing of retirement. For a sample born 1931-
1944, followed from 1982 until 2004 when aged 60-71, they did not discern any effects of AE on the 
timing of retirement.  
In summary, the two articles on long term earnings effects of AE for older workers concern sam-
ples which are narrowly defined due to restrictions prior to AE (Stenberg and Westerlund 2008) or 
post enrolment (JLS 2005a). Even though both studies reported net positive effects for society, the 
results in other studies are more ambiguous in terms of the private effects of AE (Schwerdt et al. 
2011, Stenberg et al. 2011) and regarding society’s costs (Stenberg 2011). Thus, given the enormous 
interest among policymakers, we know surprisingly little about the costs and benefits associated with 
education for older.  
The contribution of this paper is to present an evaluation of formal education for a broadly de-
fined sample aged 42-55 at the time of enrolment, 1994-1995. We explore information on annual 
earnings until 2007, when the age span of our sample is 55-68, thereby stretching beyond the official 
retirement age at 65.
 The results indicate positive effects of AE on average earnings for females, but 
not for males. An interesting finding is that the beneficial effects of AE largely pertain to females who 
at an earlier stage appear to have been constrained from AE participation by household responsibili-
ties such as child rearing. In an international perspective, this may suggest that by targeting e.g. in-
formation campaigns to this relatively well defined group, efficiency in educational investments 
could be improved. Taken as a whole, and contrary to earlier studies, we find that the benefits are 
not sufficient to cover total costs. Consequently, for the sample we study, the generous AE policy in 
Sweden does not seem to have eased the burden of support of an aging population.    6 
The following section provides a brief outline of the institutional framework regarding adult edu-
cation in Sweden and a description of the data. The empirical strategy is described in Section 3 and 
the results are presented in Section 4. We assess society’s costs and benefits in Section 5 before a 
concluding discussion in Section 6.  
2  Institutional setting and data  
2.A   Education for adults in Sweden 
The institutional and legislative set-up in Sweden is relatively favorable for adults who wish to engage 
in formal education. AE is therefore a common feature of an individual career path and it attracts 
about 2 per cent of the labor force each year (including individuals only registered in one course). 
The demand for AE is enhanced by the fact that employees have a legally protected right to take a 
leave of absence for studies and thereafter return to the same job. Full-time students are also en-
titled to financial support which covers modest living expenses (a mix of loans and allowances of 
approximately €800 per month). On the supply side, municipalities are mandated to offer adult 
schooling covering subjects at the “compulsory” (elementary and lower secondary) and upper sec-
ondary (high school) level. This is provided by municipal education centers Komvux, where access to 
courses is relatively unrestricted. The compulsory level courses mainly cover Swedish and mathemat-
ics, whereas upper secondary level courses encompass a wide range of theoretical subjects, as well 
as courses related to health care, nursing and computer skills, but only to a lesser degree other voca-
tional courses. Komvux also offer a small supply of “supplementary courses” (påbyggnadsutbildning) 
which are vocational and officially classified as tertiary education.  
Compulsory school in Sweden today is nine years, followed by upper secondary school which, 
depending on the type of schooling, is one, two or three years. One year upper secondary education 
is dominated by health care and nursing, whereas two year upper secondary programs are consider-
ably more heterogeneous. Three broadly defined groups will be distinguished: commerce, manufac-  7 
turing (including craftsmanship and technology) and transport (including vehicle engineering and 
media communication). Three year upper secondary schooling is mainly theoretical and preparatory 
for higher (tertiary) education. The general requirement for tertiary education, which is provided in 
about 30 cities (in a total population of 9 million), is completion of a three year upper secondary 
school.   
Adults who enroll at Komvux choose their own combination of courses. The aim may be to com-
plete courses in basic skills such as numeracy and/or literacy (compulsory level), to complete a one- 
or two year upper secondary diploma, to become eligible for tertiary education via a three year dip-
loma or to complete a (few) specific course(s) as part of a leisure activity or for labor market related 
reasons. The level of detail in our data, presented in the next section, will allow us to distinguish rea-
sonably well among these activities.  
2.B   Design of the study 
This study is based on population register data administered by Statistics Sweden. Records of annual 
labor earnings are available 1982-2007 and Komvux transcripts of course registrations from 1979 to 
2007. Our sample consists of all individuals born in Sweden between 1939 and 1952 and living in 
Sweden 1990-2007. Thus, the individuals are aged 42-55 in 1994 and 55-68 in 2007, allowing us to 
follow individuals up to and beyond the years when retirement typically occurs.
 The choice of sample 
is motivated by the fact that retirement becomes increasingly feasible from the age of 55, and by the 
fact that records of completed AE course credits are only reported from 1994 onwards. The courses 
offered at Komvux are mainly at the upper secondary level (80 percent) and compulsory level (15 
percent). We therefore restrict our analysis to those whose highest attained level of education prior 
to AE enrolment is two years of upper secondary schooling or below, thereby excluding about one 
third of the population born 1939-1952. Individuals are also excluded if they were registered in AE at   8 
some point 1979-1993.
6  This restriction means that until 1993, all individuals in the sample have 
year after year rejected (or not considered) the idea of participating in AE. Our “treatment group” 
consequently consists of first-time enrollees in AE in 1994 or 1995. The comparison group either did 
not register in AE at all 1979-2007, or registered for the first time in 1996 or later. This leaves us with 
a total sample of 636,314 individuals, of which about one percent (6,311) is treated. As one would 
expect, the youngest cohort, born in 1952, has the highest proportion of treated. The lowest propor-
tion is found for the cohort born in 1939. For males, the fractions range from .26 percent to 1.06 
percent and for females from .47 to 3.13 percent. The overrepresentation of females among partici-
pants in AE (68 percent) plausibly reflects gender differences in life-cycle patterns of labor market 
careers.   
Note that we allow for enrolment in AE to occur also after 1995 since we do not want to condi-
tion on events which occur after 1994-1995. Re-enrolment is of foremost importance for the years 
1997-1999, when the Swedish government launched the Adult Education Initiative. It enabled indi-
viduals to conduct full-time studies at Komvux with financial support equal to the individual’s level of 
unemployment insurance benefits (e.g. Stenberg 2007a, Stenberg and Westerlund 2008). The pro-
portion of treated registered in AE was 12 percent in 1998 and gradually fell to 1 percent in 2004. In 
the comparison group, the fraction registered at Komvux peaked in 1998 at 2.0 percent.  
Table 1 presents descriptive characteristics by gender for treated and untreated. Most of the av-
erage treated-untreated differences are statistically significant, diverging in terms of education, age 
and the number of children at home.
7 There are also differences in the proportions receiving various 
social insurance payments such as unemployment insurance, early retirement pensions and social 
                                                           
6 This excludes 22.6 percent of the sample, including 29.4 percent of those with two year upper secondary education.  
7 Our sample was born from 1939 until 1952. The compulsory school was gradually extended into the present nine-year 
system during the 1960s, affecting birth cohorts from 1949 and onwards. This means that more than half of our sample 
attended the old schooling system, where school length was seven or eight years, varying between municipalities. Pupils 
with better marks were selected to attend their seventh year at junior secondary school (realskolan) which was at least 
three years and a prerequisite for upper secondary school. Among those not selected, there was a second chance to enroll 
in junior secondary school in the year(s) that followed.   9 
welfare. The last ten rows of Table 1 also indicate that, in the years preceding AE enrolment, social 
welfare benefits and sick-leave benefits increased more for the treated.
8  
Earnings trajectories 1982-2007 of treated and non-treated are presented in Figure 1 (males) and 
Figure 2 (females). The treated-untreated averages are remarkably similar from 1982 until 1992. For 
males, the differences are below 1 percent in ten of the twelve years before treated experienced a 
drop in earnings of 9.1 percent in 1993. Treated females experienced a slight positive trend relative 
to untreated. Their average in 1982 was 2.4 percent below untreated but in 1992 their earnings were 
3.1 percent higher. As in the case of males, treated females also experienced a drop in average earn-
ings in 1993, by 5.8 percent.
9 For both males and females, the earnings drop of the treated observed 
in 1993 was further deepened as they enrolled in AE 1994 and 1995. This had been recovered by the 
year 2000 to exceed the non-treated averages and the treated-untreated earnings gap then gradually 
increased until 2007. The overall decline in earnings at the end of the period reflects an increase in 
the proportions retiring from the workforce.  
2.C   The content of adult education 
Table 2 describes the content of AE for our treated sample. We have access to detailed information 
on course registrations as well as the grades obtained (but not attained diplomas). Each course is 
associated with a number of credits and we summarize each individual’s registrations expressed in 
years of full time studies. A course is defined as “completed” only if the grade is “pass” (or higher).  If 
the grade is lower and/or if an interruption is reported, the course is considered as not completed. 
With this definition, only about half of the registered courses were completed, and only around one 
third of the compulsory level courses, indicating that initial skill level is associated with completion. 
The total average of completed studies is .36 years for treated males and .60 years for females.  
                                                           
8 Averages amounts are overall low as about 75 per cent of the individuals received zero benefits.  
9 The male earnings trajectories of both treated and untreated already had dropped before 1993. This reflects the severe 
recession between 1990 and 1993 when unemployment rates in Sweden soared from 2.1 to 11.3 percent (ILO definition) 
before the situation stabilized, 1994-1996. An economic recovery saw unemployment rates decrease to 5 percent in 2000, 
and then hover between 5 and 7 percent for the remainder of the period.   10 
About one third of the treated were at some stage registered at compulsory level; about 75 percent 
at upper secondary level and about 7 percent completed some education at tertiary level. Of those 
registered at the lowest (compulsory) level, about 58 percent were at some point also registered at 
upper secondary level. The supplementary courses at Komvux are officially classified as tertiary level 
courses and are accordingly included in the reported amount of completed tertiary level education. 
Otherwise, tertiary education is conducted outside Komvux where our records do not cover registra-
tions, only completed courses. 
Figure 3 shows a histogram of completed AE among treated. Many participants only completed a 
few course credits. About 27 percent completed no courses at all while 38 percent completed more 
than .25 years of AE, corresponding to roughly ten weeks of full-time studies, and 18 percent of the 
treated completed more than one year of AE.
10 Interestingly, among those with zero completed 
courses, the average amount of registered course credits (.225 years of AE) is almost identical to the 
group completing credits > 0 but < .25 years of studies (.217).  This is important from a cost-benefit 
perspective as the potential benefits emerging from completed courses must be compared with the 
cost of the total supply of courses. 
3  Empirical strategy  
To estimate the average effect of AE on earnings, our empirical strategy is to use difference-in-
differences outcomes where treated individuals are compared with comparable untreated individu-
als by nearest-neighbor matching on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, Smith and 
Todd 2005). The approach is described in more detail in Section 3.A. In Section 3.B, we discuss two 
alternative specifications which we use for the matching procedure.   
   
                                                           
10 This is considerably less than what Stenberg (2011) reported for AE enrolees 1994-1995 aged 24-43, where about 50 
percent completed at least one year of full time studies.    11 
3.A   Difference-in-differences propensity score matching 
Our outcome of interest is defined as ΔYit = (Yit – (Yi1992+Yi1991+Yi1990)/3) where Yit denotes annual earn-
ings for an individual i in a given year t after treatment. Comparing these differences between 
treated and untreated, we control for unobserved time invariant heterogeneity across individuals 
(fixed effects). Except for such heterogeneity, the empirical approach assumes a selection mechan-
ism into AE based on observables. The propensity score is obtained for each individual by fitting a 
probit model to estimate the probability of enrolment, given pre-AE observed covariates. We select 
four untreated individuals with propensity scores closest to those of each given participant in AE, and 
a weighted average outcome of these represents the counterfactual. An advantage of the matching 
procedure is that it allows us to explicitly control how weights are attached to members in the com-
parison group. One may thereby obtain estimates of the average treatment effect of the treated 
(ATT) even if the effects of AE are heterogeneous across individuals.
11 To identify causal effects of AE 
on earnings it is necessary to assume that, conditional on the covariates, any remaining mechanisms 
affecting the decision to enroll in AE must be independent of future outcomes (further discussed in 
Section 3.B). This makes it inappropriate to condition on events occurring after 1994-1995 and we 
therefore allow that individuals in the comparison group enroll in AE from 1996 or later.
 12 Further 
assumptions include that the probability to enroll in AE must be strictly positive and, for the esti-
mates to reflect ATT, an individual’s enrolment in AE must not influence outcomes for the other indi-
viduals in the study (the stable unit treatment value assumption, SUTVA, or no interference assump-
tion). This condition is further discussed in Section 5.  
   
                                                           
11 In contrast, the implicit weights of the OLS estimators are proportional to how often a value of an explanatory variable 
occurs and to the variation in treatment for this value. Assuming heterogeneous treatment effects, it generates a weighted 
average which is not necessarily of interest to a researcher (Angrist 1998, Cobb-Clarke and Crossley 2003).  
12 The matched comparisons completed on average .07 years of AE, corresponding to less than three weeks of studies. The 
results presented in Section 4 remain very similar if one conditions the comparisons to have zero registrations in AE.   12 
3.B   Two model specifications 
Due to potential transitory shocks prior to AE (Ashenfelter’s dip), the pre-AE earnings in our differ-
ence-in-differences outcome is defined as the average earnings 1990-1992, i.e. the last observation is 
at least two years prior to AE enrolment. In addition, we present estimation results from two model 
specifications; our “benchmark model” disregards changes occurring 1992-1993 and 1993-1994, 
whereas our “extended model” explicitly accounts for these in the matching procedure. The rationale 
for using the two models is that temporary and/or permanent changes prior to treatment may be 
systematic, potentially causing biased estimates.  
With the benchmark model specification, the covariates on which we balance are employment 
sector (7 categories), age (14 categories), prior education (7), number of children at home (6), age of 
children (6), rural or metropolitan area (3), regional employment level, pre-treatment annual earn-
ings and earnings trajectories (levels 1982 – 1992), as well as five different kinds of social insurance 
benefits related to unemployment insurance (UI), parental leave, sick-leave, early retirement 
pensions and social welfare, applying both dummy variables (zero earnings, incidence of the various 
benefits) and continuous measures of amounts in SEK in 1992. By construction, annual earnings is a 
composite variable encompassing both productivity and probability of employment as it reflects 
hourly wage levels multiplied by the number of hours worked. In all, balancing treated and untreated 
on these covariates should provide a credible control for systematic differences in labor market 
productivity as measured in 1992, and trends prior to 1992. 
Table 3 presents probit estimates of AE enrolment for males and females, using both the bench-
mark model and the extended model specifications.
13  The matching procedures turn out to generate 
samples of matched comparisons which are well balanced with the treated individuals. Tests for the 
                                                           
13 We excluded variables from our probit estimations if they were associated with p-values above .2 unless they were es-
sential for our balancing tests. Including irrelevant covariates in the set-up of the matching procedure has been shown to 
increase the bias and/or variance of matching estimators (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, Waernbaum 2008).   13 
null hypothesis of equal means, based on the benchmark model, are presented in Table 1 and gener-
ally indicate p-values at .30 or higher (to save space, not all variables are included, see note b) of 
Table 1). This pattern holds throughout as we vary the definition of treated in the next section. The 
exception is, of course, that when using the benchmark model, changes in earnings 1992-1993 and 
social insurance benefits 1992-1993 and 1993-1994 remain unbalanced, in particular for males.  
If there are permanent effects of changes (“shocks”) prior to AE enrolment, the benchmark mod-
el captures beneficial effects of AE minus negative effects of changes which are unbalanced between 
treated and matched comparisons. Considering e.g. the drop in earnings among treated, observed in 
Table 1, and that layoffs following employment fluctuations have been reported to have persistent 
effects on average earnings (Eliason and Storrie 2006, Schmieder and von Wachter 2010), our 
benchmark estimates will tend to be conservative.  
In our extended model specification, covariates are added to explicitly account for changes prior 
to AE enrolment. Theoretically, participation in AE should be related to some form of change in con-
ditions (examples given in the introduction). Therefore, we now control for changes in social insur-
ance benefits 1992-1993, and 1993-1994, regarding sick-leave, social welfare, early retirement 
pensions, as well as changes 1992-1993 in UI payments and annual earnings.
14 To see how one would 
expect this to affect our results, it is useful to make an admittedly simplified distinction between 
demand side changes – one can think of shocks outside the control of the individual, such as plant 
closures due to changes in world market prices – and supply side changes – related to individual be-
havior e.g. deteriorating health and/or motivation. Both types of changes imply decreased earnings 
                                                           
14 In accordance with Heckman and Smith (1999), our extended models also balance treated and untreated on transitions in 
labor force status 1992-1993. In total this concerns nine different transitions between outside the labor force, employment 
and unemployment. For reasons of space, these variables are not included in Table 1, but some of them significantly explain 
participation in AE (see Table 3). Including benefit payments received in 1994 among covariates is potentially incorrect if AE 
causes increased sick-leave, early retirement or social welfare in the first year of enrolment for those enrolled in 1994. 
Excluding these variables has only a minor impact on our estimates in Section 4.    14 
and lower opportunity costs of AE, but may differ in their long-run consequences on earnings.
15 In 
the typical case of an Ashenfelter’s dip, temporary demand side changes are more common among 
participants in a program (Ashenfelter 1978 and e.g. Heckman et al. 1999, Heckman and Smith 1999). 
The estimates are then upward biased as negative long-run consequences would dominate among 
the matched comparisons. Such an assumption is untestable and we therefore find it justified to 
compare the estimates of the extended model with the plausibly conservative benchmark esti-
mates.
16  
4  Results 
The results presented in this section concern the benchmark model and the extended model specifi-
cations presented in Section 3. Section 4.A contains the main results. It is followed in Section 4.B by 
estimates pertaining to groups with different amounts of completed AE. Gender differences are ad-
dressed in Section 4.C.  
4.A   Main results 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 present trajectories of average annual earnings for matched samples of males 
and females, both of the benchmark model and the extended model. Figure 3 concerns the full sam-
ple of treated, whereas the definition of treatment in Figure 4 is restricted to those who completed 
at least one year of AE. Treated-untreated trajectories are virtually identical from 1982 until 1992 
before the averages of the treated drop in 1993, and as AE enrolment occurs 1994-1995. The drop in 
earnings from 1994 and onwards gives an indication of the individuals’ opportunity costs of AE and 
also, to the extent that it reflects foregone production value, an indication of the indirect costs of AE 
for the society. These costs appear substantial as the trajectories of treated males never catch up 
with those of the matched comparisons, and treated females only exceed the level of their matched 
                                                           
15 For example, the balance on changes in sick-leave transfers is not adequate if it reflects dripping noses among treated but 
hip, back or shoulder problems with long term implications among untreated (or vice versa).  
16 To be precise, if treated and matched comparisons differ in the background causes of the changes, and our covariates fail 
to capture this, the extended model may entail a risk for upward or downward biased estimates.   15 
comparisons from 2001 onwards. The gaps between these trajectories are reflected by our differ-
ence-in-differences propensity score matching estimates. Consequently, these estimates are general-
ly below zero until in 2001 or later years. The discussion in this section primarily concerns estimates 
from the latter part of the period, while the initial negative effects are taken into account in Section 5 
as we consider the costs of AE. 
Table 4 present difference-in-differences estimates from 1996 to 2007, separately for males and 
females.
 For the full sample of treated, results from the benchmark model are presented in columns 
(1) and the extended model in columns (2), whereas columns (3) show the extended model estimates 
applied on treated who completed at least one year of full-time AE. For each column, a new matched 
comparison group is created (as described in Section 3). Graphical expositions are presented in Fig-
ures 5 and 6, where the grey lines represent the extended model estimates. For males, the point 
estimates remain negative throughout, although not significantly different from zero from 2001 (ex-
tended model). This may reflect an absence of effects of AE or that any positive effects are offset by 
negative long-run consequences of pre-program changes and/or locking-in effects of AE if it detaches 
individuals from the labor market. As expected, the extended model yields more positive results than 
the benchmark model, but the discrepancies are much larger for males. This is because the bench-
mark model to a greater degree fails to balance male treated and matched comparisons on changes 
1992-1993 and 1993-1994, in particular on increases in sick-leave benefits (see Table 1). The pattern 
is very similar to Heckman and Smith (1999) who compared an experimental control group from the 
U.S. Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) with an untreated comparison group derived from non-
experimental data. They found that taking into account labor force transitions prior to enrolment 
substantially reduced downward bias in estimates for males (from -$5,228 to -$450).
17 
                                                           
17 As with our results, their estimates pertaining to females were relatively insensitive to model specification. With a small 
upward bias remaining (not statistically significant from zero), they hypothesized it could reflect family characteristics which 
were not measured well in their study. When we exclude controls for the number of children at home in 1992 and the age 
of the children (six categories each), we find estimates 2002-2007 to increase by on average 8 percent.   16 
For the sample of females, the estimates for treated females are positive and significantly differ-
ent from zero from 2001 and onwards. For females completing at least one year of AE, the extended 
model estimates for 2002-2005 correspond to between 8 and 11 percent of the average earnings of 
the untreated comparisons, increasing to about 13 percent in 2006 and 2007. Rudimentary estimates 
of the earnings returns to a year of AE may be given by dividing these percentages with the average 
amount of completed studies, 2.04 years.
18  These are between 3.8 and 5.3 percent in 2002-2005 
before increasing to above 6 percent in 2006 and in 2007.  
4.B   Different exposures to treatment 
As discussed in Section 2, the majority of the treated completed less than .25 years of AE.
 Figure 7a 
through 7m give difference-in-differences estimates for samples of treated with different amounts of 
completed credits , from zero accomplished credits (Figures 7a and 7b) to treated who completed 
some tertiary level courses (k and m).  
One would not expect zero completed credits to have any causal effects on earnings. For males, 
the results of the extended model are insignificant with point estimates close to zero, whereas the 
benchmark model yields significantly negative estimates through the whole period. The estimates for 
females hover around zero, regardless of model specification.  
For the group with credits > 0 but < .25 years of AE, the average completed AE is below .10, cor-
responding to less than four weeks of full time studies. Again, one would not necessarily expect such 
low intensity treatment to have noticeable causal effects. However, we find positive point estimates, 
statistically insignificant for males but significantly above zero for females. It is possible that there are 
short courses with a significant payoff on earnings, but the proportion registered in vocational 
courses, including subjects related to health care, is only at 8 percent, compared with 62 percent 
                                                           
18 For a year t, the formula could be written [(ATT / average earnings of untreated comparisons)t / average AE completed].    17 
among treated completing > .25 years. The group is instead overrepresented in English courses, per-
haps indicating “consumption” of AE, i.e. that courses are used to enhance the utility of leisure rather 
than of work.
19 The sample of treated (0 < AE < .25 years) is particular on two accounts; the earnings 
level 1982-1992 is 10-20 percent higher than other treated and their earnings drop in 1994 and 1995 
is only 3 percent and completely recovered by 1996. It may be that many of these individuals re-
ceived a job offer shortly after enrolling and that the positive estimates pertaining to females with 
>.25 but <.50 years of AE probably capture a weaker but similar mechanism (Figure 7 f). We also note 
that our ATT estimates for females display the expected increasing pattern for treated females with 
>.50 but < 1 year of AE (Figure 7 h), females completing at least one year of AE (no tertiary Figure 7j) 
and females with some tertiary level education (Figure 7 m).  
A plausible explanation for this U-shaped association between credits and the earnings return is 
that job-search decisions are correlated with decisions to enroll AE (see also Heckman and Smith 
1999). Although there are untreated who search for jobs as well, it seems likely that AE enrollees 
who job search may partly be matched with comparisons who do not search for a new job. If there is 
an effect of job search in itself (e.g. a mobility premium), it may bias our estimates upward if the 
decision to search for a new job influences the decision to enrol in AE, e.g. following a lay-off. 
20 On 
the other hand, a payoff to job search can also be seen as an indirect effect of treatment, as access to 
AE may influence the propensity to search, and since stimulating job mobility is one of the main pur-
poses of the public provision of AE. This should occur if AE is expected to ultimately increase the 
probability of finding a job, and perhaps also if AE prevents depreciation of human capital or social 
marginalization as unemployed. In Section 5, we discuss what our assumptions in this regard imply 
for the cost-benefit analysis. 
                                                           
19 The “core subjects” at upper secondary level (English, Swedish and mathematics) overall attract similar fractions of the 
treated, 50, 42 and 43 percent. In the group with > 0 but < .25 years of AE, however, the proportions are 31, 12 and 12 
percent. 
20 Note that this problem would remain with quasi-experimental data. In the case of randomly distributed AE vouchers, job-
searchers could still be more likely to use the vouchers. Only by randomly rationing seats in AE among individuals already 
interested in attending AE is the proportion of job-searchers equal between treated and untreated.    18 
Whether one or the other of the two interpretations is valid, an earnings effect of job search in 
itself could make the relation between our estimates and the amount of completed AE ambiguous. 
Basically, this depends on how the expected marginal returns to job search and further investment in 
AE evolve during participation. If the most productive enrollees also tend to be the best job search-
ers, it is possible that they will drop out of AE at an early stage as they receive and accept job offers.
 
While the remaining participants complete more course credits, good job searchers continue to leave 
AE to accept job offers, but less frequently because the remaining participants are on average less 
productive job searchers than the very early drop outs. Moreover, reservation wages may increase as 
the investments in AE approach levels at which expected wage offers improve.
21 When the amount 
of AE reaches this level, the participants consist of individuals whose future earnings are less likely to 
be affected by their job search skills and/or intensity, i.e. only the direct effect of AE remains.  
Now, we fully acknowledge that the above gives a stylized and somewhat pessimistic view of par-
ticipants completing a large number of credits, but it is at least partly consistent with a positive 
payoff to “just showing up” and the non-monotonic point estimates reported in Jacobson et al. 
(2005a, 2005b), Stenberg and Westerlund (2008) and Stenberg (2011).  
4.C  Gender differences 
Larger estimated effects for females are standard in the literature on active labor market program 
evaluations, but the underlying reasons behind such results are rarely addressed. By scrutinizing the 
data presented in Section 2, one finds that treated males to a greater degree than treated females 
are associated with increases in sick-leave benefits in the years preceding enrolment (see Tables 1 
and 3). One hypothesis is that males who enroll in AE tend to be closer to some form of labor market 
marginalization, which potentially offsets any positive earnings effects of AE. Treated females, on the 
                                                           
21 The hazard function for exit from education to employment then has a negative slope for short spells in AE. Again, note 
that even if a social experiment generates perfect random assignment to AE, estimates of ATT pertaining to early dropouts 
would be positive to the extent that there is a random element in the assignment to jobs with good earnings prospects.   19 
other hand, may have had a higher latent demand for AE if they in earlier years were subject to re-
strictions due to household responsibilities. Children at home in 1992 might be an (albeit blunt) indi-
cation of restrictions which have prevented earlier AE enrolment.
 22 Results displayed in Figure 8 per-
tain to females with less than two children (a) and two children or more (b), completing at least .5 
years of AE. For the sample of females having less than two children at home in 1992, the estimation 
results are barely significantly different from zero (only 2006 and 2007), whereas strong positive ef-
fects are found for females with at least two children.
23  The average difference in the point esti-
mates for 2002-2006 corresponds to about 5 percent in terms of their annual earnings. We also find 
that females with zero or one child in 1992 were more associated with increases in sick-leave bene-
fits prior to AE enrolment in 1993-1994 (also 1992-1993 for the subsample with no children). Hypo-
thetically, it is possible that the positive estimates reflect labor supply effects following child-rearing. 
24  To prevent such a mechanism, the matched comparison groups are balanced on the number of 
children at home (six categories), the age of children (six categories), earnings each year 1982-1993, 
and changes in benefits 1992-1993 and 1993-1994.
25 A time trend in the labor supply therefore 
seems unlikely to be a confounding factor. However, one should here note that it is difficult to entire-
ly separate the hypothesized effect from heterogeneous effects related to prior earnings. Stenberg 
and Westerlund (2008) and Stenberg (2011) have previously reported high returns to AE for individu-
als with low earnings.
 26 Nevertheless, the results hint at an important policy implication as child rear-
ing females could be a suitable target group for educational investments aiming to enhance the pro-
duction potential. In countries with lower female labor force participation than in Sweden (where it 
is similar to males), the corresponding effect could be smaller if females tend to be unwilling to enter 
                                                           
22 A similar mechanism, but related to young mothers with small children, has been discussed in earlier work (Stenberg 
2007b, p15, Bergemann and van den Berg 2008).  
23 The average amount of completed credits is similar between the treated groups, corresponding to 1.62 vs 1.53 years. 
When we abstain from the restriction of at least .5 years of completed AE, to include full samples of treated, the gap in 
point estimates is reduced by almost one third.  This is consistent with the hypothesis of an inherent demand for AE as we 
then introduce effects of job search which presumably are unrelated to the actual human capital investment.  
24 “Labor supply” is a somewhat inaccurate term since hours of work may also reflect the probability of finding employment 
under labor market excess supply, or in job search equilibrium under imperfect information.  
25 As an additional control for family situation, the samples are balanced on disposable income, which gives males and 
females equal weights of household income. 
26 Based on total earnings measured 1982-1990 among treated females, the share with above median earnings among 
treated females with two children or more was 26 percent, while 58 percent if with zero or one child.   20 
the labor market, but it may also be larger if AE increases labor supply. Importantly, we emphasize 
that our results are only suggestive on this point and further research is needed before strong policy 
recommendations can be made.  
5  Costs and benefits to society 
To assess what our results imply for policy, we compare the total benefits of AE with approximations 
of the direct and indirect costs incurred by society. As always, this kind of exercise is by necessity 
based on several untestable assumptions and should be interpreted with caution.  
The direct costs are calculated as the product of the total amount of course registrations among 
treated, multiplied by the average costs as stated by the responsible public agencies. The benefits are 
assumed equal to the ATT estimates for participants completing at least one year of AE. We extrapo-
late the earnings gains recorded in 2007 until individuals are 64 years old, meaning that the stream 
of benefits gradually shrinks as the number remaining in the workforce decreases, and eventually 
becomes zero in 2017 when the youngest cohort turns 65. Both benefits and indirect costs (forgone 
earnings) are multiplied by 1.4 to include payroll taxes and better represent a production value. Fur-
ther, we assume no crowding out effects of AE (see Dahlberg and Forslund 2005) and a discount rate 
of 3 percent. We then find that the present value of the benefits covers the direct costs by 2014. 
However, when adding indirect costs in the shape of a deadweight loss of 20 per cent, and society’s 
loss in terms of foregone production, only 30 percent of the total costs are covered by the time the 
youngest cohort retires (35 percent if we include treated with at least .50 years of AE).
 27  
With one reservation, our conjecture is that the costs of AE for older workers were not covered. 
Our reservation concerns the possibility that we underestimate the returns to AE when we disregard 
                                                           
27 We assume the average probability of a non-employed replacement is .35, which is half the employment rate (.70) in the 
older segment of the low and medium skilled population (considered as the upper bound). The stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA) assumes a program has no influence on non-treated’s number of hours worked. In this case, earnings 
losses are an appropriate measure of foregone earnings. The other extreme is to assume all vacancies are replaced by non-
employed, reducing foregone production to zero (Johnson and Layard 1986).    21 
the positive earnings payoff for individuals with short stints in AE (notably below .50 years). If one 
interprets these as indirect effects of AE, the average returns in Table 4 are slightly reduced but con-
cern a much larger sample of treated. It increases the total returns to society such that 90 percent of 
the costs are covered by the time the youngest cohort turns 65. For AE to exceed its costs in a non-
trivial manner, which is necessary if one wishes to claim that it is the most efficient use of public 
funds, one also needs to assume non-pecuniary welfare effects of AE on the society as a whole. In 
the present case, these are required to increases the returns to society by a factor of about 1.5, or by 
about 2 if one assumes that half of the job-search effects are related to AE. Such effects are typically 
difficult to measure, but some studies have suggested substantial external effects of education.  Cal-
culations in Albrecht et al. (2009) indicate general equilibrium effects of AE in Sweden which make 
social returns exceed private returns by a factor between 1.5 and 2, following job-composition ef-
fects and externalities on productivity. External effects of education have also been reported on 
productivity (e.g. Moretti 2004, Kirby and Riley 2008) and health (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2008). 
Welfare effects could also encompass aspects such as equity, democracy and social cohesion.
28 In 
sum, to argue that benefits exceed the costs, we believe one must infer that there are substantial 
benefits of AE from its effect on stimulating job search and from its external effects on society.  
6  Summary and discussion 
Increasing public investment in formal education of older workers has many proponents among pol-
icy makers in North America and Europe, and there are seemingly good economic reasons for the 
strong interest in this measure. In addition, public policies targeting low skilled may be necessary for 
upgrading their qualifications as on-the-job-training mostly falls to high skilled. Low skilled may lack 
access to on-the-job training because of employers’ preferences and/or because low skilled might be 
unwilling to participate due to a perception of low returns and/or financial constraints (Oosterbeek 
1998, OECD 2003, 2006, Schwerdt et al. 2011).  However, our results do not support that AE of older 
                                                           
28 A negative side-effect is that the possibility of AE enrolment may cause adolescents to drop out of school prematurely. 
While this does not regard the sample of our study, it is a cost to society as it may distort incentives.   22 
workers would alleviate the economic effects of an aging population, neither in terms of an increased 
tax base, nor in terms of net effects on total real resources. In order to justify the investments, the 
unmeasured indirect effects of AE through stimulating job search and positive externalities would 
have to be fairly large, arguably beyond what one may find plausible. In combination with earlier 
evidence suggesting that AE has no effect on the timing of retirement (Stenberg et al. 2011), the 
impression is strengthened that policymakers may be overly optimistic concerning the average ef-
fects on productivity and labor supply of education for older workers.  
Our results indicate positive effects of AE on earnings for females, but insignificant effects for 
males. The gender gap in our estimates may stem from different underlying reasons for enrolment. 
Male participation is associated with increased levels of sick-leave benefits shortly before enrolment, 
while females appear to some extent to have been driven by a latent demand for AE which has earli-
er been suppressed by household responsibilities. This suggests that females who were previously 
restricted by e.g. child rearing might constitute a suitable target group in countries where one seeks 
to expand and/or introduce formal education for adults. Generally, the results in this paper have to 
be interpreted with care, and in the light of the two following comments. First, the study concerns AE 
which targets low and medium skilled. Human capital investments at the tertiary level may have dif-
ferent implications than those reported here. Second, most countries in the OECD are currently re-
viewing and reforming pension systems, which may have implications for the effects of adult educa-
tion on earnings. The individuals in our sample, born 1939-1952, are part of two overlapping pension 
schemes. The new scheme makes earnings later in life more important for the level of pension en-
titlements. If it has important effects on work incentives, it could also influence the incentives to 
exploit earnings enhancing potential of formal education, even if completed at the age of 42 or high-
er. Unfortunately, education for older workers is a hitherto neglected area of research and we know 
little about the importance of the surrounding institutional set up.   
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Table 1; Descriptive averages as measured in 1992 unless otherwise stated, of treated and untreated, including benchmark model 
matched comparison groups. Amounts given in SEK 2004 prices, in thousands, where € 100 is approximately SEK 970.
 
                       
  Males           Females         
























Total completed AE (years)  .363  .019  .000  .028  .000    .600  .055  .000  .091  .000 
Age in 1994
 b)  46.88  48.41  .000  46.91  .792    46.65  48.74  .000  46.64  .871 
Born 1952   .121  .067  .000  .117  .697    .127  .058  .000  .124  .619 
Born 1939   .027  .061  .000  .026  .826    .022  .071  .000  .021  .726 
No. of children at home
 b)  1.27   1.09  .000  1.27  .911    1.40  .98  .000  1.40  .806 
Years of schooling
 c)  9.90  9.43  .000  9.94  .400    9.99  9.58  .000  10.00  .701 
Less than 9 years of schooling  .229  .403  .000  .215  .302    .150  .303  .000  .144  .469 
9 years of schooling
   .197  .174  .006  .202  .715    .177  .172  .366  .180  .714 
- Junior secondary school  .158  .138  .009  .167  .423    .121  .119  .595  .058  .863 
1 year of upper secondary school  .016  .009  .000  .014  .497    .207  .164  .000  .209  .879 
2 years of upper secondary school  .558  .414  .000  .569  .460    .466  .361  .000  .467  .914 
- Commerce  .062  .053  .076  .062  .974    .221  .163  .000  .224  .775 
- Manufacturing  .364  .256  .000  .367  .819    .041  .028  .000  .039  .680 
- Transport  .047  .034  .002  .053  .375    .025  .025  .897  .026  .811 
No sector reported 
d)  .033  .043  .030  .041  .162    .034  .070  .000  .034  .882 
Farming and mining 
d)  .036  .065  .000  .033  .619    .016  .021  .012  .016  .914 
Construction 
d)  .135  .157  .006  .138  .810    .024  .016  .000  .023  .709 
Manufacturing 
d)  .216  .272  .000  .217  .962    .091  .129  .000  .091  .978 
Finance, insurance 
d)  .083  .077  .291  .084  .898    .097  .098  .848  .097  .964 
Public sector 
d)  .116  .075  .000  .118  .883    .487  .414  .000  .485  .867 
Other sector 
d)  .381  .311  .000  .370  .459    .250  .252  .814  .254  .714 
Earnings 1982 
b)  161.9  163.0  .924  159.6  .385    87.9  90.0  .480  86.8  .445 
Earnings 1988 
b)  189.1  188.5  .816  188.0  .737    115.6  114.7  .397  115.4  .897 
Earnings 1992 
b)  177.9  178.8  .709  175.4  .497    131.0  127.0  .001  131.5  .753 
Zero earnings 1992  .131  .141  .210  .145  .186    .091  .130  .000  .086  .394 
Unemp. insurance (UI) > 0  .112  .079  .000  .110  .851    .114  .066  .000  .111  .682 
− average amount if >0  55.2  54.5  .764  54.8  .893    32.4  34.3  .145  32.1  .862 
ALMP benefits > 0  .082  .036  .000  .080  .829    .054  .026  .000  .052  .691 
− average amount if >0  33.8  29.2  .038  33.8  .999    28.8  28.3  .788  30.9  .309   27 
Table 1; Continued.                       
Parental leave benefits > 0  .026  .015  .000  .027  .864    .030  .013  .000  .028  .723 
− average amount if >0  11.2  13.4  .443  15.5  .214    24.4  23.3  .712  22.6  .560 
Sick-leave benefits > 0  .260  .221  .000  .263  .844    .279  .273  .342  .272  .454 
− average amount if >0  30.4  28.5  .371  32.0  .503    20.3  22.7  .024  19.9  .722 
Early retirement > 0  .025  .052  .000  .031  .264    .034  .094  .000  .033  .869 
− average amount if >0  68.0  77.5  .032  69.3  .778    56.2  64.9  .000  54.7  .521 
Social welfare benefits > 0   .098  .049  .000  .096  .832    .075  .050  .000  .072  .562 
− average amount if >0  14.3  10.5  .002  14.4  .956    8.3  7.7  .408  7.4  .292 
Regional employment   .724  .722  .000  .724  .630    .723  .722  .063  .723  .654 
Inland of Norrland
 e)   .049  .062  .016  .049  .927    .053  .054  .727  .050  .550 
Stockholm county
 e)  .160  .132  .000  .159  .880    .140  .136  .391  .142  .786 
Earnings change 1992-1990  - 12.7  - 8.3  .005  - 12.3  .874    .1  .2  .915  .3  .810 
Changes in amounts 1993-1992                       
Earnings
 f)  - 16.3  - 9.6  .000  - 8.7  .001    - 7.5  - 5.2  .000  - 4.4  .000 
UI benefits
 f)  4.6  2.5  .000  2.9  .019    4.0  1.4  .000  1.8  .000 
Early retirement
 f)  1.8  3.9  .000  2.7  .057    2.6  5.6  .000  2.8  .604 
Sick-leave benefits
 f)  2.3  - .4  .000  - 1.1  .000    - .3  - 1.2  .001  - .6  .399 
Social welfare benefits
 f)  .5  .1  .000  .1  .040    .3  .1  .000  .1  .032 
Changes in amounts 1994-1993                       
Early retirement
 f)  - .3  - 1.9  .000  - .5  .633    - 1.5  - 3.2  .000  - .9  .023 
Sick-leave benefits
 f)  2.0  .1  .000  - .1  .004    .9  .1  .003  .3  .172 
Social welfare benefits
 f)  .1   -.0  .109  - .2  .148    .1   -.0  .034  - .0  .148 
                       
N  2015  339654    7868 (weighted)    4296  290349    16415 (weighted) 
a) t-test for equality between average of treated and untreated matched comparisons.     
b) Balancing tests also include age dummies (14 categories), dummies for number of children (six categories), age of children (six categories) and annual earnings 
each year 1982-1992. To save space, these are not displayed. Please note that all variables are balanced when the extended model is applied. 
c) To obtain years of schooling, “less than the 9 years of schooling” is assumed to be 8 years, and one and two years of upper secondary school 10 and 11 years. 
d) If sector is not reported in 1993, we use the latest reported sector from previous years, back to 1990. 
e) The inland of Norrland is a sparsely populated area in the north of Sweden with permanently higher than average unemployment rates. Stockholm County hosts 
20 percent of the population, and the overall employment level is higher than in any other region of Sweden. 
f) Variable is balanced between treated and matched comparisons when the extended model is applied (not displayed).
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Table 2. Content of adult education (treated individuals only). Credits are ex-
pressed in years of full-time studies. 
     
  Males  Females 
N  2015  4296 
Total registered course credits at Komvux (years)  .568  .890 
Total completed course credits at Komvux (years)  .295  .525 
     
Proportion registered in compulsory level courses  38.0 %  34.2 % 
Registered compulsory credits, average  .144  .133 
Completed compulsory credits, average  .042  .046 
Completed compulsory credits, if registered at level  .110  .134 
     
Proportion registered in upper secondary level courses  68.2 %  78.7 % 
Registered upper secondary credits, average  .392  .712 
Completed upper secondary credits, average  .243  .468 
Completed upper secondary credits, if registered at level  .357  .595 
     
Proportions in type of upper secondary course registration     
- English  38.2 %  44.5 % 
- Swedish  28.2 %  30.9 % 
- Mathematics  33.5 %  29.5 % 
- Social sciences  48.8 %  66.0 % 
- Natural sciences  14.0 %  14.5 % 
- Human sciences (e.g. foreign languages)  13.2 %  16.7 % 
- Computer sciences  64.4 %  66.6 % 
- Health-related subjects (e.g. nursing)  12.3 %  35.9 % 
- Vocational courses  12.7 %  6.7 % 
     
Proportion registered in supplementary level courses  5.0 %  4.6 % 
Registered supplementary level credits, average  .017  .020 
Completed supplementary level credits, average  .010  .011 
Completed supplementary level credits, if registered at level  .204  .251 
     
Proportion completing some tertiary level education  7.3 %  7.2 % 
Completed tertiary education, average  .078  .086 
Completed tertiary education, if registered at level  .925  1.029 
     
Total adult education completed (years)  .363  .600 
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Table 3: Maximum likelihood estimation of a probit model for the propensity score.
 a) 
   
     
       
     
   
Dependent variable: AE course registration in AE 1994-1995.  
  Males 
     
      Females
     
   
  Benchmark     Extended 
model 




  Std.Err.  Coeff.
  Std.Err.    Coefficient
  Std.Err.  Coeff.
  Std.Err. 
Less than 9 years of schooling
   -.188 
*** (.027)  -.193 
*** (.027)    -.194 
*** (.019)  -.200 
*** (.019) 
9 years of schooling
   -.067 
**  (.029)  -.072 
**  (.029)    -.103 
*** (.021)  -.110 
*** (.021) 
- Junior secondary school                .137 
*** (.032)  .139 
*** (.032) 
1 year of upper secondary school                           
2 years of upper secondary school                           
- Commerce  - .049    (.039)  - .049    (.039)    .062 
*** (.017)  .061 
*** (.018) 
- Manufacturing  .052 
**  (.026)  .050 
*** (.026)    .107 
*** (.034)  .104 
*** (.034) 
- Transport                           
Farming and mining   -.210 
*** (.066)  -.182 
*** (.066)    -.002 
  (.058)  .013 
  (.059) 
Construction   -.110 
*  (.059)  -.106 
*  (.057)    .238 
*** (.055)  .250 
*** (.056) 
Manufacturing   -.108 
*  (.058)  -.082 
  (.056)    -.021 
  (.041)  -.000 
  (.043) 
Finance, insurance   -.031 
  (.061)  -.009 
  (.060)    .065 
  (.042)  .090 
**  (.043) 
Public sector   .074 
  (.060)  .103 
  (.058)    .107 
*** (.037)  .147 
*** (.039) 
Other sector   .035 
  (.056)  .061 
  (.054)     .091 
**  (.038)   .116 
*** (.040) 
Earnings 1992 
b)  .075    (.143)          .175    (.111)  .175    (.111) 
Δ earnings 1992-1990 
b)                - .024    (.016)  - .039 
**  (.016) 
Unemp. insurance (UI) > 0   .046 
  (.030)  - .057 
  (.037)     .215 
*** (.032)  - .021 
  (.036) 
− amount of UI 
b)   
     
      -.099 
  (.073)  .028 
  (.081) 
Parental leave benefits > 0   .052    (.054)   .051    (.054)               
ALMP benefits > 0   .131 
*** (.048)   .118 
**  (.049)     .167 
*** (.033)   .147 
*** (.033) 
− amount 
b)   .216 
**  (.102)   .279 
*  (.104)     
     
   
Sick-leave benefits > 0   .038    (.021)  .018    (.216)               
− amount if above zero 
b)   .057 
*  (.032)   .187 
*** (.036)               
Early retirement pension > 0                           
− amount if above zero 
b)  - .277 
*** (.071)  - .174 
**  (.085)    - .367 
*** (.054)  - .410 
*** (.063) 
Social welfare benefits > 0    .152 
*** (.035)   .118 
*** (.036)     .103 
*** (.029)   .086 
*** (.030) 
− amount if above zero 
b)   .352 
**  (.141)   .695 
*** (.154)     .338 
*  (.176)   .610 
*** (.188) 
Regional employment   .939 
*** (.352)  .939 
*** (.354)    .988 
**  (.397)  1.035 
*** (.399) 
Inland of Norrland 1992   - .069 
*  (.038)  - .072 
*  (.038)               
Stockholm county 1992                 - .049 
*  (.027)  - .053 
*  (.027) 
Transition 1992-93 OLF – unemp. 
c)   
     .433 
*** (.118)           .573 
*** (.109) 
Transition 1992-93 emp.  – unemp. 
c)    
     .159 
*** (.036)           .289 
*** (.028) 
Transition 1992-93 emp. – emp. 
c)    
     
            - .090 
*** (.027) 
Δ earnings 1992-1993    
    -.029 
**  (.015)          -.046 
**  (.020) 
Δ UI benefits 92-93   
                  .099 
*  (.057) 
Δ early retirement benefits 92-93   
    -.067    (.072)          -.193 
*** (.068) 
Δ sick-leave benefits 92-93   
    .231 
*** (.035)               
Δ social welfare benefits 92-93   
    .743 
*** (.149)          .943 
*** (.183) 
Δ early retirement benefits 93-94   
     
            -.301 
*** (.088) 
Δ sick-leave benefits 93-94   
    .147 
*** (.027)          .053    (.036) 
Δ social welfare benefits 93-94   
    .620 
*** (.145)          .704 
*** (.174) 
Notes: 
*** significant at the 1 % level. 
**  at the 5 % level. 
*  at the 10 % level.
 
a) All regressions include a constant term, age-dummies and when relevant dummies for number of children (six categories) 
and age of children (six categories). These are not displayed for reasons of space. 
b) SEK 2004 prices divided by 100,000, € 100 is approximately SEK 970. 
c) OLF= outside labor force, a binary variable which takes the value one if annual earnings are below SEK 20,000 (app. 
$3,000) and individual received no transfers related to unemployment insurance or active labor market programs. 
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Table 4. Difference-in-differences propensity score matching estimates. Bootstrap standard errors based on 500 replications in parentheses.
 
       
       
   
   
       
       
   
 
Dependent variable: Earnings difference ΔYjt = (Yit – (Yi1992+Yi1991+Yi1990)/3)
       
       
   
 
 
  Males       
       
   
  Females       
       
  Benchmark model  Extended model
  Extended model
   
  Benchmark model  Extended model
  Extended model 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Final year (t)   All AE    All AE      
  > 1 year  % 
a)) 
   
   All AE    All AE    
  > 1 year  % 
a) 
2007  -8302  -3684     
  -11531    -3.2% 
   
  12154  14087   
  17901    6.3% 
    (3868)
    (3769)
    
   (10374)
     
   
    (1702)
    (1816)   
    (3426)
     
2006  -7401
  -3159
    
  -218
    -.1% 
   
  11270
  12412   
  18577
    6.5% 
    (3534)
    (3562)
        (9714)
     
   
    (1824)
    (1901)   
    (3420)
     
2005  -7502
  -3923
       -4900
    -1.4% 
   
  9574
  10203   
  15192
    5.3% 
    (3452)
    (3490)
        (9814)
     
   
    (1768)
    (1807)   
    (3319)
     
2004  -8915
  -4457
       -3493
    -1.0% 
   
  8209
  9600   
  11772    4.1% 
    (3225)
    (3367)
        (9809)
     
   
    (1741)
    (1794)   
    (3285)
     
2003  -8177
  -3075
       -7388
    -2.1% 
   
  8067
  9726   
  14685
    5.1% 
    (3165)
    (3174)
        (9495)
     
   
    (1633)
    (1649)   
    (3322)
     
2002  -8826
  -3871
       -15570
    -4.3% 
   
  6656
  8675   
  11069
    3.8% 
    (3114)
    (3242)
        (9218)
     
   
    (1606)
    (1577)   
    (3453)
     
2001  -11304
  -6883
       -28259
    -7.8% 
   
  4573
  6995   
  4828
    1.7% 
    (3033)
    (3101)
        (9394)
     
   
    (1578)
    (1558)   
    (3393)
     
2000  -13776
  -9465
       -50049
    -13.9% 
   
  1059
  3114   
  -2754    -1.0% 
    (2939)
    (2929)
        (8864)
     
   
    (1502)
    (1549)   
    (3366)
     
1999  -16545
  -11502
       -61043
    -17.6% 
   
  -2882
  -879   
  -11577
    -4.2% 
    (2850)
    (2778)
        (8306)
     
   
    (1430)
    (1440)   
    (3222)
     
1998  -19458
  -13647
       -67035
    -20.1% 
   
  -7217
  -5729   
  -20423
    -7.6% 
    (2736)
    (2731)
        (8285)
     
   
    (1324)
    (1412)   
    (3007)
     
1997  -21339
  -16154
       -67499
    -21.5% 
   
  -13784
  -11695   
  -32416
    -12.5% 
    (2628)
    (2673)
        (8132)
     
   
    (1279)
    (1306)   
    (2881)
     
1996  -25343
  -20316
       -71134
    -23.6% 
   
  -21438
  -18911   
  -48340
    -19.2% 
    (2481)
    (2636)
        (7793)
     
   
    (1157)
    (1189)   
    (2604)
     
                 
   
         
       
N
TREATED  2015  2015        234 
   
   
  4296  4296   
  943     
N
UNTREATED (weighted)  7669  7886        932 
   
   
  16265  16241   
  3687     
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Figure 2. Completed AE among treated, expressed in years of full time studies. 
 
 
Note: For expositional reasons, 4.6 percent of the individuals with more than 2.5 years of AE are excluded. 
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Figure 3. Annual earnings, treated and matched comparison group.  
 
Note: N
TREATED = 2,015 and N





TREATED = 4,296 and N
UNTREATED = 16,241 (weighted). 
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Figure 4. Annual earnings, treated with at least one years of AE, and matched comparison group.  
 
Note: N
TREATED = 234 and N





TREATED = 943 and N
UNTREATED = 3,691 (weighted). 
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Figure 5. Full samples, difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimates, bootstrap stan-
dard errors. Benchmark model in black, extended model in grey  
 
Note: N
TREATED = 2,015 and N





TREATED = 4,296 and N


















Figure 6. Treated with at least one year of AE, difference-in-difference propensity score matching 
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Figure 7. Difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimates, bootstrap standard errors. 
Benchmark model in black, extended model in grey. N
TREATED within parenthesis. 
 
a) Zero completed credits – males (683)  b) Zero completed credits – females (1035)  
   
 
c) AE > 0 but <.25 years  – males (781)  d) AE > 0 but <.25 years  – females (1414) 
   
 
e) AE > .25 but <.50 years  – males (179)  f) AE > .25 but <.50 years  – females (421) 
     
 
g) AE > .50 but < 1 year  – males (147)  h) AE > .50 but < 1 year  – females (518) 
      




















































Figure 7 cont. Difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimates, bootstrap standard errors. 
Benchmark model in black, extended model in grey. N
TREATED within parenthesis. 
 
i) > 1 year, no tertiary level AE – males (127)  j) > 1 year, no tertiary level AE – females (701) 
   
 
k) Some tertiary level AE – males (147)  m) Some tertiary level AE – females (311) 
   
 





























Figure 8. Treated with at least .50 years of AE, difference-in-difference propensity score matching 
estimates, bootstrap standard errors. Benchmark model in black, extended model in grey  
 
Note: N
TREATED = 678 and N





TREATED = 769 and N
















Females > 1 child in 1992